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Abstract 
 
The Financial Crimes Management  
of Account Takeover Fraud 
 
Misty Heaven Vasquez, M.S.I.M.S 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  Kathleen Suzanne Barber 
 
Account takeover can be a damaging and personally intrusive type of fraud occurring 
when an unauthorized individual obtains and uses another individual’s personally 
identifiable (PII) information to gain unauthorized access to an existing account. Account 
takeover fraud continued to be a serious fraud threat in 2016 that affected millions of 
consumers resulting in billions in fraud losses. This research clearly defines account 
takeover fraud, investigates how account takeover incidents occur, describes the impact for 
both consumers and the financial industry, and offers mitigating tactics to combat and 
recover from account takeover incidents.  
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Overview of Account Takeover Fraud 
The U.S National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines personally 
identifiable information (PII) as: 
1. any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, 
mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and  
2. any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such 
as medical, educational, financial, and employment information 
(NIST, 2010, p. 13).  
The United States government has developed many federal and state laws to protect 
the distribution and accessibility of PII because this information is so valuable and can 
result in severe repercussions for individuals if compromised. Compromised PII can be 
used to steal an individual’s identity or money, also known as identity fraud. Identity fraud 
is a term used to describe when an unauthorized individual obtains and uses some portion 
of another individual’s PII to commit fraud or deception for economic gain (Javelin 
Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 63).  
Account takeover, also known as ATO, is a type of identity fraud that occurs when 
an unauthorized individual obtains and uses another individual’s PII to gain unauthorized 
access to an existing account. Once an account takeover occurs, identity thieves can update 
the victim’s personal information and proceed to gain access through the financial 
institution’s online website, mobile app, or customer service representative channel. 
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THREE PHASES OF ACCOUNT TAKEOVER INCIDENTS 
Account takeover incidents occur in three phases: account takeover attempt, 
account takeover without money movement, and account takeover with money movement. 
An account takeover attempt occurs when an unauthorized individual attempts to access a 
victim’s account without success. This situation is like a home burglar trying to open a 
door or window but has yet to enter the house. An account takeover without money 
movement occurs when an unauthorized individual successfully accesses a victim’s 
account and may have updated personal information or security settings on the account, 
but has yet to conduct any type of money movement transactions. This situation is like a 
home burglar successfully entering an individual’s home but has not yet stolen anything 
from the house. Account takeover with money movement occurs when an unauthorized 
individual successfully accesses a victim’s account and has conducted at least one money 
movement transaction. This situation is like a home burglar successfully entering an 
individual’s home and stealing items from the home. 
A financial institution’s overall goal should be to detect incidents within the 
account takeover attempt phase to avoid the account takeover incident from progressing 
any further. Mitigating tactics should continue to build at each phase of the event to help 
minimize the consumer impact and monetary losses to the financial institution. For 
example, mitigating tactics may consist of locking a customer’s account, initiating security 
notifications to request the customer contact the financial institution, and updating accounts 
to prevent the withdrawal of funds. Financial institutions should also develop operational 
dashboards to measure the number of incidents:  
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• mitigated within the account takeover attempt phase. 
• detected to include the fraud avoidance associated to the account takeover without 
money movement phase. 
• detected to include the fraud loss associated to the account takeover with money 
movement phase. 
An effective dashboard enables a financial institution to take both a broad look and a deep 
dive into data, evaluate the effectiveness of their tools and processes, and execute 
continuous improvements to detect activities associated with each phase.  
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
The “Account Safety in Banking Scorecard” study, released by Javelin Strategy & 
Research, proved that account takeover fraud continued to be a serious threat in 2016. 
According to Javelin, account takeover fraud affected 1.4 million consumers resulting in 
$2.3 billion in losses (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 8). Losses increased from $1.4 
billion to $2.3 billion, a 64% increase from 2015 to 2016 (see Illustration 1). The increased 
trend could be a result of the decrease in profitability of counterfeit card operations due to 
the financial industry’s transition from magnetic stripe to a more secure chip enabled debit 
and credit cards. The transition from magnetic strip cards that stored static card information 
to chip enabled cards that generate a unique code for every transaction made it more 
difficult to counterfeit chip enabled cards.  
Javelin’s “2017 Identity Fraud: Securing the Connected Life” study found the top 
four types of accounts affected by account takeover incidents in 2016 consisted of checking 
or savings accounts, major credit card accounts, email accounts, and mobile phone 
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accounts (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 6). Mobile phone account takeover 
incidents appeared to be an attractive target which nearly doubled from 7% to 12% in 2016 
(see Illustration 2). Javelin also recognized an increase in cross-account takeover incidents 
in their “Account Safety in Banking Scorecard” study. Cross-account takeover incidents 
consist of having an external account, such as an email or mobile phone, taken over in 
addition to the financial institution account. In 2016, 18% of account takeover victims 
experienced a cross-account takeover incident resulting in a steady increase since 2014 
(Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 9). Cross-account takeover incidents provide 
identity thieves the capability to intercept login credentials sent via email or text message. 
In addition, Javelin found that account takeover fraud continued to be a difficult type 
of fraud to resolve for both financial institutions and their customers in 2016 (Javelin 
Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 17 & 27). Javelin’s research found that the average fraud 
amount increased from $1,424 to $1,984. The time to resolve account takeover incidents 
also increased over 40% from 14 hours to 20 hours for financial institutions due to the level 
of difficulty to confirm the activity as fraudulent. The increased level of difficulty is a result 
of financial institutions inadvertently contacting the identity thief first regarding the 
fraudulent activity due to the thief updating the victim’s contact information as part of the 
account takeover incident. Account takeover victims also paid an average of $263 in out 
of pocket expenses per incident compared to the average of $48 per incident for other fraud 
types. 
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Illustration 1: Account Takeover Victims (Millions) and Losses (Billions) 
 
Source: Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p.8  
Illustration 2: Types of Accounts Taken Over 2015-2016  
 
Source: Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p.26  
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Anatomy of Account Takeover Attacks 
Account takeover fraud is enabled by a variety of techniques including data breaches, 
social engineering, and victim’s oversharing personal information on social network sites 
and the Internet. Data breaches continue to provide identity thieves access to exposed PII 
which can lead to account takeover fraud. Identity thieves are also known to use social 
engineering tactics to manipulate victims into releasing PII used to commit an account 
takeover. In addition to data breaches and social engineering attacks, the lack of consumer 
knowledge and education about the need to protect and how to protect their personal 
information on social network platforms will continue to fuel account takeover fraud.  
DATA BREACHES 
A data breach is an incident in which an individual’s PII is potentially at risk 
because of an exposure that occurred either electronically or in paper format. The exposed 
PII may consist of a wide range of information such as an individual’s name plus a Social 
Security number, financial account information, medical information, or login credentials. 
Within minutes identity thieves can use the exposed PII to commit account takeover fraud. 
For example, consumers who were victims of the Yahoo data breach could be at risk of 
account takeover fraud if their Yahoo login credentials are the same credentials used to 
access their accounts at their financial institution. Consumers who have listed their Yahoo 
email account as a recovery option for obtaining or resetting their login credentials may 
also be at risk. Data breaches are increasingly common and will threaten an increasing 
number of consumers over time. See Table 1 for a list of some of the largest data breaches  
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that occurred in the 21st century. 
Table 1: Large Data Breaches of the 21st Century  
Company: Date: User Accounts Impacted: 
Yahoo 2013-2014 3 billion 
Adult Friend Finder 2016 412 million 
MySpace 2016 360 million 
Equifax 2017 145 million 
LinkedIn 2012 117 million 
Sony’s PlayStation Network 2011 102 million 
Anthem 2015 80 million 
National Archive and Records 
Administration 
2008 76 million 
Source: Palermo & Wagenseil, 2017 
Javelin found that at least 1 in 3 of notified breach victims experienced fraud within 
the same year in their “2017 Identity Fraud: Securing the Connected Life” study (Javelin 
Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 7). Notified breach victims who experienced fraud continued 
to increase from 2014 to 2016, resulting in the highest rate of 31.7% (see Illustration 3). 
Javelin’s “Data Breach Fraud Impact Report: Going Undercover and Recovering Data” 
study found that $8.3 billion dollars of fraud losses originated from victims previously 
affected by a data breach in the previous 12 months in 2016. An additional $3.7 billion 
dollars originated from victims affected by a data breach in the previous two to six years 
(see Illustration 4). 
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Illustration 3: Fraud Incidence by Breach Notifications Status, 2011-2016 
 
Source: Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 12 
Illustration 4: Fraud Losses Attributable to Breaches 
  
Source: Javelin Strategy & Research, 2017, p. 9 
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Data breaches can be perpetrated by a malicious insider (insider theft or physical 
theft), a malicious outsider (hacking, skimming, or phishing), or in error (improper 
disposal, accidental loss, or exposure of PII). Gemalto’s data analysis on security breaches 
identified 1,792 breaches occurred resulting in 1.4 billion data records were either lost, 
stolen, or compromised in 2016 (Gemalto, 2017, p. 2). The number of records exposed 
resulted in an 86% increase from 2015 even though 936 of the breaches had an unknown 
number of records compromised. Data breaches continued to prove that no industry is 
immune from an attack by malicious outsiders (See Illustration 5). Malicious outsiders 
accounted for more than two thirds of identified data breaches in 2016. Identity theft was 
the most common type of attack and accounted for 58.6% of the total breaches and 28.4%, 
nearly 400 million, of the records stolen.  
Illustration 5: Number of Breach Incidents by Industry 
Source: Gemalto, 2017, p. 11 
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The Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) found that Social Security numbers 
were exposed in 52% of data breach incidents, an 8% increase over 2015, and four data 
breaches alone were responsible for exposing over 120 million Social Security numbers in 
2016 (Identity Theft Resource Center, 2017). This can be problematic for any institution 
that continues to use Social Security numbers as a form of authentication since consumers 
are unable to easily change their Social Security number once these numbers have been 
exposed. According to Javelin’s 2014 Identity Fraud study found that 80% of the top 25 
banks and 96% of the top credit card issuers allowed their customers to authenticate using 
their Social Security number (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2014).  
SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Social engineering consists of tactics used to gain access to systems, data, or money 
by manipulating human psychology. Some common social engineering tactics are known 
as phishing, SMSishing or vishing. Phishing, SMSishing, and vishing are social 
engineering scams that come in the form of emails, mobile text messages, or phone calls. 
Another form of social engineering known as angler phishing targets consumers on social 
media.  
Phishing is a type of social engineering tactic which consists of fraudulent emails 
constructed to steal sensitive information by disguising as a trustworthy entity. Phishing 
emails may include files or links that will infect computers with malware once opened by 
the recipient. The malware enables cybercriminals to remotely access the infected 
computers to obtain sensitive information. Phishing emails may also consist of a message 
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that incorporates a sense of urgency or threat to manipulate individuals into releasing login 
credentials or PII such as names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers. 
For example, in 2017 a Russian hacking group, known as Fancy Bear or Pawn 
Storm, sent phishing emails pretending to be from Google informing email users of 
unexpected sign-in attempts into their email account (Kan, 2017). The phishing email 
manipulated Google users into installing a security application to further protect their email 
account (see Figure 1). Once installed the phishing victims unknowingly authorized the 
hacking group to view and manage their email by circumventing Google’s 2-step 
verification process. Google's 2-step verification consists of providing a password and a 
temporary security code received through a SMS message when accessing an email 
account. This can be problematic for financial institutions, or any other organization, that 
send temporary security codes or passwords and security alerts through email to their 
customers.  
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Figure 1: Fancy Bear Phishing Email Example 
 
Source: Kan, 2017 
 SMSishing is a type of social engineering tactic which consists of mobile phone 
text messages constructed to steal sensitive information. Identity thieves send mobile text 
messages to manipulate individuals into selecting links to malicious websites, downloading 
mobile malware, or calling a fraudulent phone number. Like phishing emails, SMS 
messages consist of a message that incorporates a sense of urgency such as “account 
suspension” or “fraudulent activity detected” to manipulate individuals into releasing 
account information, login credentials, and other personal information (see Figure 2). 
Identity thieves can take over a mobile phone account by redirecting one-time security 
codes and security alert SMS messages to a device in their possession once victims release 
PII or account information. Identity thieves can also walk into mobile phone store 
pretending to be a customer who is requesting to upgrade their mobile phone. Once 
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upgraded, the identity thief walks out with a new phone device assigned to the true 
customer’s mobile phone number. With this tactic, the true customer immediately stops 
receiving phone calls and SMS messages due to the newly activated phone device that is 
in the possession of the identity thief. Other tactics may consist of contacting the mobile 
network provider pretending to be the true customer who is needing to report a lost phone 
and needs assistance activating a new phone or requesting to forward all calls and text 
messages to a different number. 
Figure 2: SMSishing Examples 
 
Source: Weekly Summary 5/4-5/17, n.d. 
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Another form of social engineering may occur through impersonation to build a 
false sense of trust in the form of a phone call, also known as vishing. For example, an 
identity thief may manipulate an individual into believing they are a representative from 
their financial institution or some type of legal authority, such as the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), to obtain PII. The United States Government consistently warns consumers 
about identity thieves that pose as the IRS to manipulate individuals into releasing personal 
information or money (Internal Revenue Service, 2013). These calls typically involve an 
immediate actionable request that consists of providing PII and bank account details. 
Vishing attacks may also consist of exploiting a financial institution’s call center to 
manipulate customer service representatives into believing that the caller is the true 
customer. Call centers can be the weakest link for authentication since customer service 
representatives focus on delivering excellent customer service. Identity thieves may pose 
as a forgetful customer or a customer in distress to gain access to a victim’s account. For 
example, an identity thief may convince a customer service representative to expedite a 
wire request or a credit card to an alternate address due to theft event occurring while 
traveling. At this point, the identity thief provides enough of the victim’s PII to manipulate 
the customer service representative into believing that the caller is the true customer.  
Identity thieves also use social media as an attack vector by creating fraudulent 
social media accounts to social engineer for PII, also known as angler phishing. Angler 
phishing continues to emerge as a significant threat as social media accounts increased 
100% from the third to fourth quarter of 2016 (Proofpoint, 2017, p. 9). The creation of 
fraudulent social media accounts often coincides with highly publicized events, holidays, 
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major brands or corporations, or popular topics that are trending. For example, an 
individual may post on their own social media account about their frustrations with not 
being able to access their financial accounts (see Figure 3). Unknowingly, the individual 
may receive a response from an identity thief who has created a fraudulent social media 
account that directs the individual to a fraudulent website that looks exactly like their 
financial institution. The fraudulent website prompts the individual to provide personal 
information such as login and account information. 
Figure 3: Angler Phishing Example 
 
Source: Roberts, 2016 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE INTERNET 
Social networks sites have the greatest potential for abuse since the intent of these 
sites is to provide “friends” with deeper insights into people’s lives, families and friends, 
hobbies, and interests. In addition to the shared information, social network sites also 
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collect personal information such as full name, date of birth, place of residence, 
relationship status, education, employment, and any other affiliations. Social network sites 
use this personal information to increase social networking opportunities with other online 
users with similar backgrounds and interests. However, identity thieves can use PII 
obtained from these sites and the Internet to commit account takeover fraud by passing 
knowledge based authentication (KBA) questions. KBA questions consist of referencing 
previously selected and answered security questions during a recovery flow for user id and 
password credentials. KBA may also consist of questions based on an individual’s past 
credit or public records and provides multiple-choice answers. 
For example, I observed that without having to sign into a Pinterest account, I could 
access the personal information about users that posted reviews using the Pinterest Save 
button. Pinterest users that post reviews often have their username link to another social 
media account such as Facebook or Google+. One individual’s username hyperlinked to 
their Google+ page which made their personal information publicly available because their 
privacy settings were set to public instead of private. The individual’s Google+ page 
provided the following personal information: current place of residence, current and 
previous employment history dating back ten years, information about the individual’s 
family (3 children, plus 6 additional children acquired through marriage, and 9 
grandchildren), pet information, and education information to include dates of attendance 
(see Figure 4). In addition, the individual’s Instagram account could be easily located and 
confirmed through posts and pictures that were accessible from public views on both the 
Google+ page and Instagram account (see Figure 5). The Instagram account provided 
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additional personal information such as photos of the individual and their spouse on a 9-
day vacation at Hollywood Studios in December of 2016. 
Figure 4: Google+ Page Example 
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Figure 5: Instagram Page Example 
 
Identity thieves may utilize the acquired PII to obtain additional information from 
information-gathering websites such as Spokeo or Intelius. Information-gathering websites 
utilize web crawlers to aggregate data about people from billions of public records. The 
aggregate data may include information such as income, religion, relatives, current and 
former places of residences, employment history, estimated income, and estimated credit. 
These websites advertise the ease with which people searches can be initiated using an 
individual’s name, address, phone number, or email address.  
For example, another individual’s Pinterest username used their first and last name 
and included a picture of the individual. A Google search conducted on the individual’s 
name provided matches to LinkedIn, Instagram, and Intelius pages. The LinkedIn page 
 19 
provided additional personal information such as current and previous places of residences, 
employment, and education history. The Intelius site provided additional personal 
information that included the individual’s age range, different states of residences, current 
employment information, and information on immediate family members. The Intelius site 
advertised that additional personal information was available for a fee that ranged from 
$0.95 to $39.95 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Intelius Site Example 
 
Personal information may also be accessible from non-social network sites such as 
Wikipedia. Wikipedia pages can provide identity thieves the PII needed to proceed with 
account takeover or any other type of identity fraud. Examples of PII obtained from 
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Wikipedia pages may include an individual’s: full name, date and place of birth, education 
history, spouse’s name and date of birth, children’s names and dates of births, family 
relationships to include parents and siblings’ full names, employment information, and 
military service information. This type of information enables an identity thief to easily 
deceive a customer service representative to gain access to an individual’s account. 
In summary, this section provides an overview of how identity thieves obtain 
unauthorized access to PII to commit account takeover fraud. The success rate of these 
cybercrimes continued to make headlines across multiple industries impacting millions of 
Americans in 2017. For example, Equifax, one of the three largest aggregators of personal 
and financial data, announced that malicious outsiders gained unauthorized access to the 
PII of 145 million consumers in 2017 (Cybersecurity Incident & Important Consumer 
Information, 2017). The compromised data consisted of names, Social Security numbers, 
birth dates, addresses, driver’s license numbers, and credit card numbers. Less than a month 
after the Equifax announcement, Yahoo announced a revision to the number of impacted 
accounts reported for the data breach that occurred in August of 2013 (Larson, 2017). The 
revised number increased from 1 billion to 3 billion accounts impacted, which is every 
single customer account that existed at that time, exposing names, email addresses, and 
passwords as part of the data breach. The magnitude of these breaches should be of concern 
to both consumers and financial institutions since it creates the perfect toolkit to execute 
account takeover fraud. This volume of exposure and the value of the information to 
fraudsters leads to the need to research mitigating tactics to combat and recover from 
account takeover incidents.  
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Mitigating and Resolving Account Takeover Fraud 
Account takeover mitigation and resolution tactics are important to financial 
institutions since victims expect financial institutions to protect their accounts regardless 
of how an identity thief obtained their PII. For example, CBS News reported a story about 
an account takeover victim who believed identity thieves used his PII that was stolen as 
part of the Office of Personnel Management data breach in 2015 (News, 2017). Even 
though he knew he had been a victim of a data breach external to his financial institution, 
the account takeover victim still felt violated by his bank for not preventing the account 
takeover incident. Since consumers are repeatedly exposed to social engineering tactics 
and are victims to multiple data breaches, it is difficult for a consumer or a financial 
institution to identify exactly how a victim’s PII was obtained. In addition, predicting the 
unauthorized use of exposed PII is even more difficult since it can have value for many 
years. Financial institutions can minimize both the consumer and business impact by 
implementing a business model that focuses on preventing, detecting, and resolving 
account takeover incidents. However, combating account takeover needs to be a shared 
responsibility between the financial institution and their customers. The best mitigation 
tactic to combat account takeover is for both the financial institution and their customers 
to be vigilant.   
PREVENTING ACCOUNT TAKEOVER INCIDENTS 
Financial institutions can implement multiple strategies to help combat account 
takeover incidents. Strategies may consist of automatically enabling the strongest security 
settings on all customer contact channels to proactively provide education versus relying 
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on their customers to seek out information on their security centers. Educating customers 
on the risks of oversharing personal information on social media along with the risks of 
utilizing poor security settings can help mitigate account takeover fraud. In addition, 
financial institutions need to anticipate the risk that external data breaches can bring since 
exposed PII can have value for many years, if not the lifetime of the victim. 
Automatically Enable the Strongest Security Settings  
Financial institutions should automatically enable new customer accounts using the 
strongest security settings to help mitigate account takeover incidents. This may seem like 
a simple strategy, but defaults are powerful since the majority of consumers never change 
the default settings on most online websites, computers, and smart phone devices. 
Consumers tend to just trust that the developer or designer has enabled the best and most 
secure settings available for them. The default settings may consist of security methods 
such as multifactor authentication. Multifactor authentication creates a layered defense 
since it requires a combination of two or more credentials as part of the authentication 
process. Credentials may consist of a combination of what the customer has (one-time 
security code), plus something a customer knows (a password), and something the 
customer is (a biometric credential). In addition, financial institutions should offer multiple 
biometric capabilities such as fingerprint, face recognition, or voice print and multiple 
ways to utilize a one-time security code to accommodate their customer needs during the 
authentication process.  
Financial institutions should also develop a customer centric strategy to enroll 
existing customers that are capable of successfully completing these stronger security 
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methods, and to help minimize the amount of frustration and cost to implement stronger 
security for customers that may not be capable or prepared.  
One customer focused strategy may include identifying customers who have already 
established or utilized some type of multifactor authentication method. For example, 
customers that have enabled a biometric capability, such as fingerprint verification, to 
access the financial institution’s mobile app or have utilized a temporary one-time security 
code to recover login credentials for the online website. A second strategy may consist of 
conducting data analysis to identify customers that have the capability to provide the 
credentials needed to pass multifactor authentication based on available information within 
their customer profile. For example, if a customer has a mobile phone on file then he or 
she should be capable of receiving a text message with a one-time security code. Financial 
institutions can, in conjunction with a clear communication strategy and outreach program, 
automatically enroll these identified customers into multifactor authentication methods 
when accessing their accounts online, through a mobile app, or when speaking to a 
customer service representative. 
Educate Customers to be Vigilant 
Consumers will typically seek fraud prevention or resolution guidance once they 
become concerned with or have become a victim of identity theft or account takeover fraud. 
Therefore, financial institutions should proactively communicate to educate customers on 
the need to be vigilant in protecting their account, along with how to be vigilant. Creating 
a connection to the audience by using easy to understand terms and real-life scenarios to 
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articulate what the risk is, why it is a risk, and how to avoid the risk will help the message 
be more effective.  
Communication should consist of educating their customers on the latest social 
engineering tactics and should be followed by prevention tips. For example, educating 
customers about the dangers and consequences of using social media since these sites 
encourage users to provide and share personal information. Articulating how the Internet 
can provide a false sense of anonymity which may lead users to overshare their personal 
information to an invisible and unknown audience. Providing simple reminders to avoid 
oversharing personal information online and to never post personal information that an 
identity thief could use to gain access to an email and/or financial accounts can help 
mitigate account takeover incidents. Providing guidance to enable and customize privacy 
settings can also help control who has access to the personal information customers choose 
to share online. In addition, advising their customers to also be selective when they respond 
to friend or follow requests since the Internet makes it easy for people to misrepresent their 
identities. 
Financial institutions should humanize their communication by articulating how 
identity thieves can continually leverage exposed PII that is extremely difficult to update. 
For example, reminding customers that updating account information and login credentials 
is easy, but obtaining a new Social Security number is extremely difficult to obtain. In 
addition, compromised PII can sell for less than a dollar in the underground of the Internet, 
also known as the Dark Web.  
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Using prevention tips to communicate with customers about security can also help 
enable customers to be vigilant. One prevention tip may consist of enabling the strongest 
security settings available on smart devices, email, and financial accounts. A second 
prevention tip may consist of providing guidance on how to be creative when establishing 
a strong password along with the importance of using a separate password on each account 
to help minimize the risk of an identity thief having the password to multiple accounts if 
compromised. It is always helpful to include an example on how to create a stronger 
password such as using the first letter of each word from a verse of a favorite song and 
substituting numbers or special characters for some letters. Another prevention tip may 
consist of educating customers on how to identify suspicious emails by providing common 
red flags and some examples of phishing emails that customers have received. Some 
financial institutions inform their customers to look for red flags that consist of typos, 
grammatical errors, and to be cautious of any links or attachments requesting personal 
information. In addition, the financial institution’s website should also include examples 
of phishing emails that their customers have received pretending to be from the financial 
institution along with an email address that customers can forward suspicious emails to for 
investigation. 
Allow Customers to Customize Account Alerts 
Financial institutions should provide customers the capability to easily customize 
account alerts that accommodate their own financial habits. These capabilities will help 
reduce false-positive results and maintain the level of customer participation needed to 
quickly review and respond to unauthorized activity. Customers should also have the 
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capability to easily customize their notification preferences with options to receive account 
alerts through email, text message, or push notifications. Customizable alerts may consist 
of receiving notifications for:  
• An account balance that is above or below a predetermined amount. 
• A withdrawal or deposit to an account. 
• An ATM withdrawal or debit card transaction that exceeds a predetermined 
amount. 
• Credit card transaction activity. 
Be Proactive on External Data Breaches 
Account takeover incidents can occur due to the reuse of the same usernames and 
passwords across multiple websites and services. When one of those third-party websites 
or services becomes a victim of a data breach, financial institutions should anticipate that 
identity thieves can use the exposed PII to commit account takeover fraud. Financial 
institutions should proactively review sites for leaked user credentials that identity thieves 
can use to access their customers’ accounts. Once identified, controls should be 
implemented to prohibit the use of any known passwords that are commonly used and any 
compromised passwords that have been identified in previous data breaches as 
recommended by NIST (NIST, 2017, p. 14).  
Financial institutions should also implement controls to monitor for credential 
stuffing attacks which is becoming a large source of account takeover fraud. Credential 
stuffing consists of using scripted software to rapidly test compromised usernames and 
passwords to identify credential reuse across multiple websites. Shape Network observed 
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that the testing of stolen credentials makes up more than 90% of login traffic on some of 
the largest websites and mobile applications in 2016 (Shape Security, 2017, p. 2). In 
addition, the success rate was as high as 2% for credential stuffing attacks.   
Financial institutions can also require their impacted customers to update their login 
credentials to help prevent account takeover incidents. As an example, Spotify, a music 
streaming service, proactively sent an email to some customers informing that an automatic 
password reset occurred to protect their account (see Figure 7). The email further explained 
the password reset was due to the risk that their current password may have been 
compromised during a data breach with another service that the same password is used 
(Price, 2016).  
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Figure 7: Spotify Email Example 
 
Source: Price, 2016 
Reduce the Chances of Customers being Phished 
Financial institutions should strive to have a consistent look and feel on customer 
communication to help reduce the chances of their customers falling victim to a phishing 
attack. Consistency helps customers identify red flags typically associated to phishing 
emails. For example, always including a personalized greeting that includes the customer’s 
first and last name versus a generic greeting of “Dear Customer” and a concise subject line 
that states exactly what the email is about. Communication that is in the form of an 
outbound phone call or email should never request for customers to provide any personal 
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or account information. In addition, reminding customers that the financial institution will 
never request this type of sensitive information in an outbound phone call or email. 
Customer communication should also direct customers to visit the financial institution’s 
website to link to any specialized webpages versus including any attachments or links. 
Helping customers identify red flags within phishing attacks can only help stop 
some attacks. Therefore, financial institutions should also monitor the web for 
unauthorized uses of their logo or to see if their name is associated with fraudulently 
registered domains. Proactive monitoring can enable financial institutions to shut down an 
identified fraudulent site prior to the launch of an impending phishing campaign. In 
addition, the implementation of a Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and 
Conformance (DMARC) policy can also help reduce phishing attacks against customers. 
DMARC is an email-validation system designed to detect and block fraudulent emails that 
appear to come from a financial institution’s domain. DMARC enables financial 
institutions to have email providers either quarantine (move to the Spam folder) or prevent 
the delivery of fraudulent emails. As a final mitigation tactic, financial institutions should 
also provide customers and noncustomers the capability to report received phishing attacks 
to a dedicated email address such as abuse@domainname.com or 
phish@domainname.com. Enabling customers to report phishing attacks provides financial 
institutions the opportunity to conduct cyber threat analysis on the reported phishing 
emails.  
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DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO ACCOUNT TAKEOVER INCIDENTS 
Financial institutions will not have the capability or capacity to prevent every account 
takeover incident therefore rapid detection of account takeover incidents is critical. The 
implementation of fraud detection systems and processes to detect new and existing types 
of fraud may consist of techniques that are automated or require a manual review. For 
example, data analytics enables financial institutions to approach fraud differently by 
implementing a proactive fraud monitoring program that detects anomalies. The capability 
to identify fraud quickly enables financial institutions to send security and fraud 
notifications to their customers. The combination of these approaches combined can help 
mitigate the monetary impact for both the financial institution and the account takeover 
victim.  
Implement Analytical Technologies and Strategies  
Financial institutions should implement capabilities to continually monitor 
customer behavioral patterns to detect, in real time, transaction patterns consistent with 
fraudulent activity. Using real-time data analytics enables financial institutions to leverage 
customer data to gain an understanding of fraudulent activities to identify trends, derive 
patterns, and locate anomalies in data. Some identifying key factors may consist of:  
• how often a customer typically accesses their account from a mobile device, online 
website, or customer service channel. 
• the average time it takes a customer to type in their login credentials. 
• the geographic locations that a customer typically accesses their accounts from. 
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• understanding the average length and number of calls a customer may make in a 
specified timeframe. 
Data analytics can help monitor these scenarios to identify account takeover 
incidents. For example, understanding the average length and number of calls a customer 
may make enables a financial institution to develop strategies to identify potential social 
engineering attempts that may be occurring against their customer service representatives. 
Some additional strategies may include identifying whether an IP address that is 
inconsistent with the customer’s behavior or location tries to access the customer account, 
or whether multiple IP addresses from different cities try accessing a customer’s account 
within a brief time gap.  Data analysis also enhances a financial institution’s ability to 
review and monitor multiple contact channels and banking platforms to detect cross-
channel anomalies consistent with account takeover fraud. Financial institutions can also 
link previous fraud events between people, events, locations, and times to become more 
effective in identifying new fraud trends and patterns.  
Default on Security and Fraud Notifications 
Financial institutions should immediately notify customers of any suspicious activity 
detected and of any updates to a customer’s account information to help mitigate any 
fraudulent activity that may be occurring. Security and fraud notifications can consist of 
two types of responsive alerts. One type of responsive alert consists of the financial 
institution holding a transaction until receiving a response from the customer. A second 
type of responsive alert consists of the financial institution allowing a transaction to process 
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followed by notifying the customer. Once notified, the customer will review and respond 
indicating if the processed transaction is authorized or unauthorized.  
Security and fraud notifications could consist of notifying customers of login events 
from suspicious devices, locations, or suspicious in-account activity. In-account activity 
consists of money movement transactions such as a request to expedite a debit or credit 
card to alternate address or multiple requests to move bank account funds externally. 
Notifications should alert customers of any updates to contact information such as address, 
phone number, and email addresses. Financial institutions should send these types of 
security notifications to both the previously listed contact information and the new contact 
information on the customer’s profile. Security notifications should also consist of 
notifying customers of any changes to security settings to include the enabling or disabling 
of authentication methods or requests to recover login credentials.  
Financial institutions should default to providing the customer with security and fraud 
notifications versus relying on customers to enable them on their own. Customers should 
also have the capability to receive security and fraud notifications in many different ways 
such as a push notification within the financial institution’s mobile app, a text message, an 
email, or an automated outbound phone call to the primary and secondary phone numbers 
on the customer’s profile. Notifications should provide enough information regarding the 
detected activity to enable customers to easily review and determine whether the activity 
is authorized. The financial institution should also include clear instructions about how the 
customer should respond, enabling customers to respond easily and quickly to the detected 
activity. 
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RESOLVING ACCOUNT TAKEOVER INCIDENTS 
The customer experience involving the resolution of account takeover incidents is 
crucial since it can be the key difference between the incident being a minor inconvenience 
or major disruptive event for victims. A positive account takeover resolution experience 
can help retain existing customers and strengthen customer loyalty. Financial institutions 
should provide their customers multiple channels to report fraudulent activity to help 
minimize customer frustration. These channels may consist of reporting fraudulent activity 
using the financial institution’s website, mobile app, by contacting a customer service 
representative, or in person at a branch. Prompting customers to provide as much 
information as possible when utilizing the financial institution’s website or mobile app will 
help mitigate any additional fraudulent activity. 
Assign a Dedicated Resolution Specialist 
Financial institutions should strive to provide a consistent customer service experience 
by assigning a dedicated point of contact that specializes in assisting with the resolution 
process from beginning to end. A single point of contact can help minimize 
miscommunication between different representatives and notify the victim as early as 
possible if any additional information is necessary will result in a streamlined and 
expedited resolution process. A dedicated resolution specialist can also assist with guiding 
the victim through the tools and resources provided by the financial institution to recover 
from the account takeover incident. Since account takeover incidents can be complex and 
time consuming, measuring dedicated resolution specialists on customer satisfaction rates 
versus number of accounts serviced will allow for a better customer experience. 
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Expedite the Reimbursement of Funds and Cards 
Financial institutions should expedite the reimbursement of funds and cards to help 
minimize the monetary impact for victims of account takeover. Immediately applying a 
temporary provisional credit to the victim’s account will help maintain, or even gain, a 
customer’s confidence in their financial institution. The provisional credit should include 
enough funds to cover any expected transactions, such as reoccurring payments, to avoid 
the victim from incurring any external non-sufficient fund fees. In addition, providing 
replacement cards within two to three business days and offering next day card replacement 
when necessary can minimize the unintentional impact of preventing the victim from 
utilizing impacted debit or credit cards.  
Require Stronger Security Settings 
Financial institutions should require victims of account takeover to enable the 
strongest security settings available to help mitigate the risk of repeat account takeover 
incidents. The dedicated resolution specialist responsibilities should consist of educating 
customers on the need for stronger security, assisting with enabling the stronger security 
settings, and articulating the experience going forward when using these stronger settings. 
Responsibilities should also consist of advising customers to immediately review and 
update all passwords, security settings, and credential recovery options external to the 
financial institution. Establishing stronger security settings with email and mobile phone 
providers will help mitigate account takeover incidents from occurring through intercepted 
email or SMS messages.  
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Provide Identity Theft Resolution Guidance 
 Financial institutions should provide an identity theft resolution toolkit that guides 
their customers through recommended actions that can help identify and resolve any 
additional identity fraud that may be external to the reported account takeover incident. 
The dedicated resolution specialist should assist with highlighting the importance of the 
recommended actions listed within the provided identity theft resolution toolkit. The toolkit 
should be accessible to customers through multiple channels such as the financial 
institution’s website, mobile app, email, or paper. Some best practices consist of providing 
an interactive capability that will enable customers to mark recommended action items 
complete, identify specific action items as high priority, enable reminders, and the 
capability to capture any notes related to each recommended action item.  
One recommendation should consist of advising the account takeover victim to request 
a free copy of their credit report from each of the major credit reporting agencies or by 
visiting AnnualCreditReport.com. The AnnualCreditReport.com website is a single site 
that provides consumers the ability to obtain a free credit report from the 3 major credit 
reporting agencies. Once the customer attains the credit report, the account takeover victim 
can review their credit reports thoroughly to identify and report any unauthorized inquires 
or accounts that may be external to the account takeover incident. A second 
recommendation should consist of advising the account takeover victim to place an initial 
fraud alert on their credit report that is valid for 90 days to help mitigate any additional 
identity fraud from occurring. An initial fraud alert notifies potential creditors or lenders 
that the consumer has concerns about identity theft and must take reasonable steps to verify 
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identity prior to extending a line of credit. When adding an initial fraud alert with any of 
the three major credit reporting agencies, the first agency contacted will notify the 
remaining two reporting agencies of the need to add an initial fraud alert on the consumer’s 
credit report. 
A third recommendation should consist of advising the account takeover victim to 
complete an Identity Theft Report with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The Identity 
Theft Report serves as official documentation and evidence of the identity theft event since 
the FTC is a federal law enforcement agency (Gressin, 2017). An identity theft report helps 
consumers dispute unauthorized activity by proving that their identity was stolen. The Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires credit reporting agencies to inform appropriate 
creditors of the identity theft event and remove all fraudulent information and accounts 
from the consumer’s credit report. In addition, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) prohibits creditors from submitting fraudulent debts to debt collectors. The 
Identity Theft Report also enables consumers to place an extended fraud alert or security 
freeze on their credit file for free which will notify potential creditors or lenders that the 
customer is a victim of identity theft. An extended fraud alert is valid for seven years and 
requires creditors to contact the consumer by telephone to verify requests for credit. A 
security freeze prevents creditors from accessing the consumer’s credit file unless the 
consumer provides permission. The consumer will utilize an identification number that will 
temporarily lift the security freeze allowing access to their credit file. The security freeze 
remains on the credit file until the consumer decides to remove it.  
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A fourth recommendation should consist of advising the account takeover victim to 
enroll in an identity theft protection service as such as a credit monitoring or an identity 
monitoring service as described by the FTC (Federal Trade Commission, 2016). Credit 
monitoring services alert consumers of updates identified on their credit report. Updates 
may consist of a creditor conducting a credit check, the establishment of a new line of 
credit, or updates to personal information such as name, address, or phone number. These 
alerts help consumers quickly identify unauthorized activity related to their credit report, 
so actions may be taken to mitigate an identity theft event. An identity monitoring service 
will scan the Internet, such as public records and websites, to identify and detect a 
consumer’s PII in other places that would not show up on their credit report. In addition to 
monitoring, identity theft protection services can also provide helpful resolution tools and 
help reduce out of pocket expenses.  
A fifth recommendation should consist of advising the account takeover victim to 
protect all other external accounts and services by enabling the strongest security options 
available. Updating all accounts to have a unique and complex password will help 
minimize the risk of an identity thief having the password to multiple accounts if one of 
these accounts is compromised. Updating the security settings on mobile and email 
accounts is also critical since security alerts, one-time security codes, and recovery options 
for login credentials are capable of being received through these channels. 
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Conclusion and Future Work 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This research articulated how account takeover fraud is a damaging and personally 
intrusive type of fraud. The first section defined what account takeover fraud is and the 
distinct phases of an account takeover incident. This section also described how account 
takeover fraud continued to be a serious fraud threat impacting millions of consumers and 
resulting in billions in fraud losses. The second section investigated how account takeover 
fraud can occur due to numerous data breaches across multiple industries, sophisticated 
social engineering schemes, and the oversharing of PII on social network sites and the 
Internet. The third section recommended a three-step approach that financial institutions 
can use to combat account takeover fraud and help their customers recover from account 
takeover incidents in the form of a prevent, detect, and resolve business model.  
Throughout this research I identified that financial institutions should find 
opportunities to collaborate with other industries that understand the importance of security 
and share the same commitment in the fight against cybercrimes. For example, the four 
largest mobile carriers in the United States (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint) 
announced that they are collaborating to improve the security of mobile authentication 
(Knight, 2017). This type of collaboration will help mitigate risks related to identity thieves 
intercepting one-time security codes and security alerts delivered via SMS messages. 
Google also introduced an anti-phishing feature for their Gmail app for Android and Apple 
devices that informs users of suspicious links within Gmail messages (G Suite Updates, 
2017). This type of enhancement will help prevent consumers from harmful phishing 
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attacks designed to steal PII. Collaborating across multiple industries will prove to be 
invaluable as identity thieves continuously seek out vulnerabilities in financial institutions 
and their customers. 
FUTURE WORK 
Financial institutions should anticipate that account takeover incidents will occur and 
should focus on implementing a frictionless resolution process for their customers. One 
question not examined here is what determines a best in class customer experience. This 
question offers the opportunity to explore best practices both within and outside of the 
financial industry. For example, insurance companies consistently focus on improving 
customer satisfaction associated with the filing of a property claim. With unforeseeable 
natural disasters, this process is critical since it can be a determining factor in customer 
loyalty when someone has just experienced some type of loss.  
A second research opportunity is to explore strategies to strengthen the processes 
associated with both the issuing and the recovery of credentials. These strategies are critical 
to mitigate account takeover fraud since a financial institution’s authentication processes 
are only as strong as the credential recovery processes. This research opportunity should 
also include strategies to strengthen the authentication associated with the customer service 
representative channel to help minimize the effect of social engineering tactics against 
customer service representatives.  
A final research opportunity is to explore strategies to develop a user-friendly security 
center that presents available security tools and explains the benefits these tools provide. 
This is another opportunity to explore best practices not only within the financial industry 
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but outside the financial industry. For example, Google has developed a security center 
that enables their users to quickly access security settings and tools to protect their 
information and privacy (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Google’s Security Page Example 
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